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Disclosure of Management Guidance in Conference Calls:  
Materiality, Determinants, and Consequences 
 
ABSTRACT 
The SEC advises firms to release all material information in their earnings 
announcement press release before their corresponding conference call. Until May 
2009, the NYSE went further by explicitly prohibiting the disclosure of new 
material information in a conference call. However, we document that the S&P 
500 firms, including those that are NYSE-listed, disclose a non-trivial amount of 
management guidance exclusively in their conference calls. Firms in challenging 
forecasting environments rely more on the conference call, probably because the 
call enables managers to “flesh out” the guidance. In contrast, firms with 
relatively low investor visibility and high litigation risk rely less on the 
conference call, likely due to regulatory concerns. Finally, after controlling for the 
information released at the earnings announcement, we find greater magnitudes of 
analyst forecast revisions for firms that provide relatively more management 
guidance exclusively in their conference call. Collectively, our findings highlight 
the emerging use of non-traditional disclosure channels.  
 
 
Keywords: conference calls, management guidance, disclosure venue, trading volume, analyst 
forecast revision. 
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Disclosure of Management Guidance in Conference Calls: 
Materiality, Determinants, and Consequences 
 
1. Introduction 
Today almost all large firms voluntarily host a conference call after an earnings 
announcement. The vast majority of these conference calls begin just hours after the issuance 
of the corresponding earnings announcement press release (hereafter, “press release”).1 Due to 
the close timing of the press release and the conference call, firms not only determine the total 
amount of information they will disclose at the time of the earnings announcement, they also 
choose the disclosure venue. As detailed below, the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) both have stated positions that disclosing information exclusively in a conference call 
is potentially detrimental to investors because the narrowness of the conference call’s 
immediate audience may cause uneven information dissemination. Yet in this study we 
document that firms disclose a substantial amount of material management guidance 
exclusively in the presentation portion of the conference call. We thus examine the motives 
for firms to provide incremental guidance in the conference call and the effects of disclosure 
venue on the forecast revision behavior of analysts, who represent a primary target audience 
of the conference calls.  
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) aims to “level the playing field” among investors by 
prohibiting selective disclosure. The SEC deems the traditional practice of distributing a press 
release through a broadly disseminated wire service (or filing a Form 8-K) as satisfying 
“public disclosure.” In addition, Reg FD permits disclosure disseminated via a conference call 
                                                     
1
 In our sample, the mean (median) number of minutes from the time stamp of the press release to the initiation 
of the conference call is 248 (122). Likewise, Frankel et al. (1999) find that the mean number of minutes in their 
sample between the press release and conference call initiation is 220. 
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alone, but only when: 1) the firm provides advance notice of the event to the public, 2) the 
public can listen to the event live through Internet webcasting or by phone, and 3) the 
conference call achieves “broad and non-exclusionary distribution of information to the 
public” (SEC 2000). With respect to the third criterion, Reg FD emphasizes that the firm is 
responsible (and liable) for this assessment. 
Reg FD, however, discourages firms from making material disclosures exclusively in a 
conference call. Instead, it suggests this model for disclosure of information at the time of the 
earnings announcement: 1) first, disclose all material information in a press release, and 2) 
second, having provided investors adequate advance notice, host the conference call (see 
Appendix A). Along the same lines, the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) states it is 
“strongly advisable” that any material information released in a conference call also be 
disclosed in a press release.
2,3 
In fact, Louis Thompson, CEO of NIRI, opined in an interview 
soon after Reg FD became effective that a conference call does not, on its own, achieve 
sufficient public disclosure (Caplan 2001). 
In addition to SEC oversight, firms are subject to the disclosure regulations of their listing 
exchanges. Section 202.06(C) of NYSE’s Listed Company Manual outlines the exchange’s 
“Timely Alert Policy”. Until May 2009, the Timely Alert Policy explicitly prohibited NYSE-
listed firms from disclosing non-public material news in a conference call before first 
releasing the information in a press release (See Appendices B and C). Thus, until the recent 
                                                     
2
 See http://www.niri.org/irresource_pubs/faq.cfm#1d 
3
 While Reg FD requires a firm to issue a Form 8-K if it discloses material information, conference calls are 
exempt from the 8-K filing requirement if 1) the firm files a Form 8-K for the corresponding press release, 2) the 
conference call occurs within 48 hours of the press release, 3) the firm announces the conference call’s date and 
time before the call and the conference call is publicly accessible, 4) financial and statistical information 
presented in the conference call is posted on the firm’s website. We find that among the 50 firms in our sample 
with the highest intensity of management guidance in their conference calls, only one firm files a Form 8-K for 
its conference call. 
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change in the Timely Alert Policy, NYSE-listed firms had even greater motivation, relative to 
non-NYSE firms, to avoid making material disclosures exclusively through their conference 
calls.
4,5
  
In this study, we first establish that firms make new disclosures exclusively in conference 
calls by using management guidance as the disclosure setting. To operationalize the analysis, 
we quantify the level of management guidance disclosed in the press release and incremental 
(unique) management guidance disclosed in the conference call.
6
 Any incremental disclosure 
that a firm makes in the presentation portion of its conference call stems from an intentional 
choice because the call’s presentation portion is read from a prepared script. On its face, 
purposely disclosing new material information in the presentation portion of a conference call 
should be unusual because firms issue the press release, regulators’ preferred disclosure 
medium, just a few hours before the conference call begins. Thus, firms can easily disclose all 
management guidance from their prepared conference call script in the press release first to 
ensure complete regulatory compliance. Interestingly, though, we find that the S&P 500 firms, 
including those listed on the NYSE, release a substantial amount of financial guidance 
exclusively in the presentation portion of their conference calls.  
A possible explanation for firms making incremental disclosures in the conference call is 
                                                     
4
 For their parts, the NASDAQ and AMEX exchanges only require listed companies to meet Reg FD’s disclosure 
standards. 
5
 The NYSE reiterated its press-release-only policy as recently as January 2009 (see Appendices B and C). On 
May 8, 2009, however, it amended its Listed Company Manual to permit dissemination of material information 
“by any Regulation FD compliant method.” The NYSE stated that the policy change was designed to reduce 
confusion stemming from differing NYSE and the SEC disclosure requirements. Despite no longer mandating 
the use of press releases for disclosure, the NYSE maintains that it “…continues to believe that there are benefits 
to the market and investors generally if companies issue press releases when disclosing material information…” 
and it “encourages listed companies to comply with the immediate release policy by issuing press releases.” This 
study’s sample time period predates the NYSE policy change. 
6
 We find that the sample firms release only a trivial amount of management guidance only in the press release. 
That is, firms almost always disclose guidance either in their press release and conference call, or in their 
conference call alone.  
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that the management guidance firms release exclusively in the conference call simply is not 
important information. We thus investigate whether the new management guidance in the 
conference calls is material. Existing case law defines materiality as information that a 
“reasonable investor” would consider sufficiently important to change the mix of total 
available information. Hence, a finding that actual trading is associated with a set of 
information is prima facie evidence of materiality. Indeed, we find that the level of 
management guidance disclosed exclusively in the conference call is positively associated 
with both price movement and abnormal trading volume during the 30-minute window 
measured from the initiation of the conference call. This result holds for the entire sample of 
S&P 500 firms and the subsample of NYSE-listed firms.  
Having ascertained the materiality of the management guidance disclosed in conference 
calls, we next examine firms’ determinants for relying on the conference call for disclosure. 
Regulatory and legal compliance are primary costs of exclusive conference call disclosure. To 
comply with Reg FD, a conference call containing new material information must achieve 
“broad, non-exclusionary distribution of information.” Firms whose shares enjoy high levels 
of average trading volume should enjoy high investor visibility and, likewise, have conference 
calls that are relatively closely followed by the investment community. We thus expect that 
less visible firms incur greater regulatory risk from relying on the conference call for new 
disclosures. Consistent with this expectation, we find that the proportion of the total earnings 
announcement guidance that a firm discloses exclusively in the conference call is significantly 
and positively associated with the firm’s average share turnover. Additionally, we find that 
firms in high-litigation-risk industries provide a smaller proportion of guidance exclusively in 
the conference call, which suggests that heightened litigation cost (and likely, by extension, 
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regulatory compliance cost) leads firms to not rely on the conference call venue for disclosure. 
We find no evidence, however, that NYSE firms provide a smaller proportion of their 
guidance in conference calls than non-NYSE firms. 
While potential costs associated with disclosing guidance exclusively in a conference call 
are fairly clear, corresponding benefits are not as obvious. That firms disclose new guidance 
in their conference calls, however, implies that benefits do exist. We find greater reliance on 
the conference call is associated with both higher magnitudes of realized earnings surprise and 
greater pre-earnings announcement analyst forecast dispersion for the forthcoming fiscal year. 
These results are consistent with firms in challenging information environments taking 
advantage of the conference call format to “flesh out” complex disclosures and to immediately 
field participants’ questions, perhaps particularly when managers are concerned about 
potential misinterpretation of their management guidance. 
In our final set of analyses, we examine the consequences of disclosure venue. Analysts, a 
target audience of conference calls, may be more responsive to information disclosed in a 
conference call because Bamber and Cheon (1998) report that analysts prefer direct forms of 
communication from management over written statements. After controlling for the total 
amount of news released at the earnings announcement, we indeed find the magnitude of 
analysts’ forecasts revisions are positively associated with the proportion of guidance 
disclosed exclusively in the conference call.  
This study makes three primary contributions. First, while prior literature documents that 
conference calls contain information (e.g., Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner 1999; Bowen, 
Davis, and Matsumoto 2002; Kohlbeck and Magilke 2002; Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo 2004; 
Irani 2004; Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller, 2004; Kimbrough 2005), no previous study 
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pinpoints a specific type of disclosure that drives investors’ trading during the conference 
calls. We identify that our sample firms provide a non-trivial amount of new management 
guidance in their conference calls. Though we do not believe that management guidance is the 
only material disclosure that firms make in conference calls, we find robust evidence that the 
guidance is a significant driver of trading during the conference call.   
Second, we examine the largely unaddressed topic of disclosure venue. Bamber and 
Cheon (1998), the sole paper to explicitly address firms’ choice of disclosure venue, find that 
firms are more likely to issue forecasts in a special press release when legal liability is higher 
and proprietary costs are lower. They do not, however, consider the conference call venue 
because conference calls were infrequent and typically not open to individual investors in 
their sample’s 1981-1991 time period (Tasker 1998, Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2003). 
We fill this gap by focusing on the conference call venue, which is now the second most 
important disclosure channel (NIRI 1996). Recent regulatory changes likely will lead to even 
more non-press release disclosures in the future. Our finding that managers already actively 
choose disclosure venue according to the news being announced is thus particularly pertinent.
7
 
Third, we provide new evidence regarding how analysts respond to and incorporate 
management guidance in their earnings forecasts revisions. Prior work has documented that 
analysts’ endowment (e.g., brokerage size (Clement 1999) and forecasting experience 
                                                     
7
 Reg FD’s original release explicitly prohibited firms from using their websites as a sole disclosure source of 
material information. However, in August 2008, the SEC issued interpretive guidance that firms may use their 
website exclusively for new disclosure if they first issue a “notice-and-access” press release. A “notice-and-
access” press release provides the date, time, and exact URL of the forthcoming material disclosure, such as an 
earnings announcement. Moreover, the SEC's August 2008 statement states that, in principal, a firm need not 
even issue a “notice-and-access” press release if the firm’s website qualifies as a “recognized channel of 
distribution” for investors to receive information about the firm. Given substantial ambiguity concerning what 
constitutes a website with “recognized channel” status, no firms have, as of this writing, used their websites for 
exclusive material disclosure. This study’s sample time period predates the SEC interpretative release. 
See http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2008/34-58288.pdf  
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(Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 1997)) and incentives (e.g., investment banking relationships 
(Lin and McNichols 1998)) affect their forecasts, but few studies have examined the process 
by which analysts respond to new information. In this paper, we demonstrate that analysts’ 
forecast revisions are systematically related to the disclosure channel through which new 
information is released. These results illustrate that venue choice is not innocuous, which is a 
finding of interest to regulators, investors, and academics. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We examine the amount of incremental 
guidance disclosed in conference calls in section 2. Next, we test the materiality of exclusive 
conference call guidance disclosure in section 3. We then explore the determinants of the 
conference call venue choice and its effects on analyst forecasts in section 4 and 5, 
respectively. We perform robustness checks in section 6 and conclude in section 7.   
 
2. Sample and description of primary variables  
The research setting of this paper is the disclosure of management guidance at the time of 
the earnings announcement. Prior literature establishes that management guidance is a highly 
important category of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Patell 1976; Penman 1980; Waymire 1984; 
Ajinkya and Gift 1984). In recent years, firms provide earnings forecasts more frequently at 
the time of the earnings announcement than in any other period (Anilowski, Feng, and 
Skinner 2007). Though earnings guidance is the most prominent item that firms forecast, they 
frequently forecast other financial statement line items as well, such as revenue, cash flow, 
and gross margin (NIRI 2009). We therefore collect a comprehensive set of financial 
management guidance–not just earnings guidance–disclosed in firms’ press releases and the 
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presentation portion of firms’ conference calls.8 As described below, we code 12 types of 
financial management guidance that are disclosed in the S&P 500 firms’ fiscal year-end 
earnings announcement press release and the presentation portion of the conference call.  
2.1 Data collection and measurement of management guidance intensity  
We obtain the majority of the press releases from Business Wire or PR Newswire. For a 
small number of firms whose press releases are missing on these wire services, we search the 
company’s website and its 8-K filings. We acquire almost all earnings announcement 
conference call transcripts from FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire. When a conference call transcript 
is missing on FD Wire, we search for the transcript on the company’s website.  
The labor-intensive hand collection required to identify and categorize the management 
guidance disclosed in firms’ press releases and conference calls constrains the size of a 
potential sample. We therefore select the S&P 500 firms as our sample since this index 
represents leading companies in major industries and its companies account for approximately 
75% of the total U.S. market capitalization. For all but 17 of the S&P 500 firms, we collect 
the management guidance from sample firms’ 2005 fiscal year-end earnings announcement. 
For the 17 S&P 500 firms whose fiscal years end in April or May, we use the 2004 fiscal 
year-end earnings announcement, instead of the fiscal year 2005 earnings announcement, due 
to data availability at the time of data collection. (Note that, despite these 17 firms, hereafter 
we refer to our sample as the fiscal year 2005 earnings announcement sample and we refer to 
the forecast horizon as being fiscal year 2006.) We define fiscal year using the Compustat 
convention: fiscal years ending before June of yeart are considered “fiscal yeart-1,” and fiscal 
                                                     
8
 We limit analysis to the presentation portion of the conference call, which managers read from a prepared 
script. We do not directly consider the call’s question-and-answer portion because management disclosure during 
this portion of the call is more likely to be reactive to the questions asked in the call. Hence, the question-and-
answer portion is less indicative of managers’ purposeful choice of disclosure venue. 
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years ending June and after are considered “fiscal yeart.” 
We limit analyses to forecast items that have an annual horizon (i.e., forecasts of fiscal 
year 2006 at the time of the fiscal year 2005 earnings announcement) and forecast items that 
are point or range forecasts (referred to as “hard guidance”). We focus on the annual horizon, 
as opposed to the quarterly horizon, because quarterly guidance at the time of the earnings 
announcement has a remaining forecast horizon (“shelf life”) of only 1.5 to 2 months. Annual 
guidance has an approximate horizon of nine months, and is thus more likely to have material 
informational value, on average, to investors. We consider only hard guidance because 
qualitative guidance varies greatly in its informational value and managers themselves often 
do not consider it “guidance.”9 To this point, NIRI’s 2006 survey refers to “earnings 
guidance” as a point earnings per share (EPS) estimate, a range EPS estimate, or an earnings 
model (e.g., earnings growth estimate) provided by a company (NIRI 2006).
10
 
We assign points to each disclosure category of management guidance (i.e., earnings, 
revenue, gross margin) based on our judgment of the informational importance of each 
disclosure type. Table 1 lists the disclosure types that we collect and their corresponding point 
assignments. The first category, “earnings,” includes both GAAP earnings and pro-forma 
earnings. We assign 10 points to earnings guidance, which is the highest point award. The 
“revenue” category, which carries nine points, includes both total sales revenue and 
                                                     
9
 For example, Sara Lee Corporation announced a guidance policy change in its FY2006 Q4 earnings 
announcement press release, stating: “The company will no longer provide a specific forecast for quarterly 
earnings per share or other financial metrics, which is consistent with other leading consumer products 
companies and in line with management’s focus on long-term revenue and earnings growth.” However, in the 
same press release, the company also stated that it “also believes that year-over-year sales will increase in each 
quarter. Operating profit should be down slightly in the first quarter… Profit should be up in each quarter for the 
remainder of the year” (Business Wire, 8/8/2006). 
10
 Results from tests that incorporate “soft” guidance are similar to the primary results and all inferences remain 
unchanged.  Refer to Section 6.1. 
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comparable store sales forecasts.
11
 We code operating cash flows and free cash flows in the 
“cash flow” category with a value of eight points and we code capital expenditure forecasts 
with a value of seven points. “Gross margin” and “operating margin” represent key indicators 
of performance; we assign seven points to each of these two categories. The remaining 
categories carry four or three points. We adjust the point assignments, which are based on 
range forecasts, for the precision of the specific forecast. Specifically, we judge point 
forecasts to be more informative than range forecasts, so we add one additional point to point 
forecasts.
12
  
We then create disclosure scores to capture the intensity of annual-horizon guidance in the 
press release and conference call venues. For each firm we compute a press release disclosure 
score, PRSCORE, and an incremental conference call disclosure score, CCONLYSCORE. All 
firms in our sample host their conference call only after they have issued the corresponding 
press release. Because this study’s focus is on disclosures made exclusively in the conference 
call, we measure the intensity of all guidance information disclosed in the press release, and 
then the amount of new information disclosed in the conference call. PRSCORE is the sum of 
points for the guidance items a firm discloses in its press release, while CCONLYSCORE is 
the sum of points for items that a firm discloses exclusively in its conference call.  
For example, if a firm provides the same earnings forecast in both its press release and 
conference call, we assign 10 points to PRSCORE but no points to CCONLYSCORE. If the 
firm provides the earnings forecast only in its press release, we still assign 10 points to 
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 If a firm offers both GAAP and pro-forma (non-GAAP) earnings guidance, we retain only one forecast. 
Likewise, if a firm provides both total sales and comparable store sales forecasts, we retain only one forecast. If 
the precision of multiple earnings or revenue guidance differs, we retain the forecast with the higher precision.  
12
 Results from tests that use simple frequency counts of guidance categories, instead of scores, are similar to the 
primary results and all inferences remain unchanged. Refer to Section 6.2. 
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PRSCORE but no points to CCONLYSCORE. However, if the firm provides the earnings 
forecast only in its conference call, we assign 10 points to CCONLYSCORE but no points to 
PRSCORE. Appendix D provides an example of the management guidance that a sample firm 
discloses in its press release and conference call. 
2.2 Management guidance venue descriptive statistics 
We begin with the S&P 500 firms as defined in the 2006 version of Compustat. The 
conference call transcripts of 31 firms are not available on either FD Wire or the firm’s 
website. We exclude six observations in which the firm hosted a conference call more than 48 
hours after the press release, since we deem such calls as not truly earnings announcement 
conference calls. We eliminate two firms that recently underwent a significant corporate event 
because management guidance is likely to be affected.
13
 We eliminate four observations 
because analyst forecast dispersion is missing for FY2005 Q4 and three more observations 
because forecast dispersion is missing for FY2006. The final sample size is thus 451, of which 
381 are NYSE-listed firms.
14
 
Table 2 reports disclosure frequencies by venue for each guidance category. The first 
column, “# PR”, is the count of disclosure frequency in the press release venue. The column 
“# CC Only” represents frequencies of guidance disclosures made exclusively in the 
conference call. The frequencies in the column “# Total” are the sums of “# PR” and “# CC 
Only”. The column “Both” is the percentage of the “# Total” category that is repeated in the 
conference call after first being disclosed in the press release. 
Results in Table 2 indicate earnings and revenue guidance are the most frequent disclosure 
                                                     
13
 SBC finalized its acquisition of (the former) AT&T on November 18, 2005. Viacom finalized its spin-off of 
(the new) Viacom on December 31, 2005. 
14
 While the total sample size is 451, the number of observations used in the different analyses varies according 
to data availability. 
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categories, unconditional of venue. Moreover, the frequencies in the “# PR” and “# CC Only” 
columns indicate a pattern of disclosure venue by category. Most firms providing earnings 
and revenue guidance do so in the press release: only 36 of 255 and 49 of 154 firms disclose 
earnings forecasts and revenue forecasts exclusively through the conference call venue, 
respectively. Unlike earnings and revenue, though, income statement expense items, cash 
flow, and capital expenditures are commonly presented exclusively in the conference call. For 
example, 37 of the 51 gross margin forecasts and 131 of the 188 tax expense forecasts are 
presented only in the conference call. The column “Both” indicates that when a firm provides 
an earnings forecast, 77.3% of the time it discloses that forecast in both the press release and 
conference call.  
Descriptive statistics for the guidance intensity scores are reported in Table 3. The mean 
(median) CCONLYSCORE is 8 (4), while the mean (median) PRSCORE is 11 (10). The 
magnitudes of the mean and median of CCONLYSCORE compared to the magnitudes of the 
mean and median of PRSCORE suggest that firms provide a nontrivial amount of incremental 
guidance information in the conference call.  
Table 3 introduces the variables PRONLYSCORE and TOTALSCORE. PRONLYSCORE 
represents the intensity of guidance disclosed only in the press release. PRONLYSCORE has a 
mean of just 2 and its third quartile is 0. This indicates that firms release almost no 
management guidance only in the press release. Instead, we find that in practice, firms chose 
to release guidance either in the press release and the conference call, or in the conference call 
alone. This result is consistent with firms using the conference call to elaborate on information 
first released in the press release. Due to the paucity of press release-only guidance, we do not 
perform analysis on press release-only disclosures. 
  
13 
 TOTALSCORE, defined as PRSCORE+CCONLYSCORE, represents the level of 
management guidance disclosed across both venues. Thus, it is apparent in comparing the 
magnitudes of PRONLYSCORE and TOTALSCORE that firms repeat the majority of their 
management guidance first disclosed in the press release later in the conference call. Thus, the 
conference call typically contains more total management guidance than the press release.  
We also introduce a standardized measure of exclusive conference call guidance intensity, 
PROPORT, which is the ratio of CCONLYSCORE to TOTALSCORE. PROPORT captures the 
relative amount of guidance that firms exclusively disclose in their conference call. Thus, 
PROPORT takes the amount of total guidance that a firm discloses at the earnings 
announcement as fixed and provides a view of disclosure shifting across venues. The mean 
(median) value of PROPORT is 47.7% (41.8%), indicating that, according to our 
measurement method, approximately half of the management guidance information released 
at the earnings announcement is contained exclusively in the conference call. Note that 
PROPORT is defined for only 372 of the 451 sample firms due to the fact that 79 firms 
provide no scorable guidance in either the press release or conference call (that is, 
TOTALSCORE=0). 
We report several other variables in Table 3. PRTOCCMINS is the number of minutes 
elapsed from the press release time stamp to the initiation of the conference call. The small 
values of PRTOCCMINS (mean=247.8, median=123.0) confirm that the press release and 
conference call events occur close in time. PRLENGTH (CCLENGTH) is the number of words 
in the firm’s press release (presentation portion of its conference call). The mean and median 
of CCLENGTH are more than twice those of PRLENGTH. This finding is consistent with 
firms elaborating on information first provided in the press release during the conference call. 
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AFTERHRS, which equals one if the firm’s conference call begins outside of normal trading 
hours, has a mean of 22.8%, which corresponds to 103 sample firms beginning their 
conference calls when the markets are not open. 
Table 4 reports pairwise correlation coefficients for key variables used in this study. We 
highlight that the correlation between PRSCORE and CCONLYSCORE is significantly 
negative (=-0.135, p-value=0.01). This negative correlation is consistent with the conference 
call being a substitute venue for the press release; that is, firms disclose more guidance in their 
conference calls when they disclose less guidance in their press releases. 
 
3. Materiality of Exclusive Conference Call Disclosures 
In this section, we test whether the new conference call disclosures are indeed material. 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) and Kim and Verrecchia (1991) demonstrate that price 
changes and trading volume reflect the arrival of information. Given that price and volume 
reactions are each informative about the materiality of a public announcement, we examine 
both to infer whether investors trade on management guidance disclosed exclusively in the 
conference call.  
3.1 Measurement of abnormal trading reaction  
Intra-day trade data is obtained from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database to 
calculate abnormal trading volume immediately surrounding the conference calls.
15
 We 
compute two measures of stock price volatility, 
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 Following prior literature (e.g., Ng, Rusticus, and Verdi 2008), we require the TAQ observations to conform to 
several rules to ensure data integrity. Trades must be “good” trades (CORR=0 or 1), occur under regular sale 
conditions (COND= blank or *), have a positive trade price (PRICE>0), have a positive trade size (SIZE>0), and 
have an absolute change in price from the previous trade of less than or equal to 10%. 
  
15 
RANGE = (HIGHPRC – LOWPRC) / MEANPRC16 
VOLATIL = SDPRC / MEANPRC 
where: 
HIGHPRC =  The highest stock price during the event window 
LOWPRC =  The lowest stock price during the event window 
MEANPRC =  The mean price during the event window 
SDPRC =  The standard deviation of price during the event window. 
 
We also measure trading volume,  
VOL = The number of shares traded during the event window 
 
 
Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen (2007) estimate that the mean (median) duration of the 
presentation portion of conference calls in the recent time period is 18.41 (17.49) minutes. 
Thus, we measure the trading data using a 30-minute event trading window starting from the 
initiation of the conference call. We use a short window to capture trading activity directly 
related to information disclosed in the call. We limit our market analyses to the 348 sample 
firms that begin their conference call between 9:30 am EST and 3:30 pm EST (before 30 
minutes prior to market close) so that we can measure the immediate market reaction to the 
conference call (Berkman and Truong 2009). 
Even in the absence of a conference call, the variables RANGE, VOLATIL, and VOL may 
vary systematically across firms. We thus measure pre-event RANGE, VOLATIL, and VOL 
over 45 trading days, ending 10 trading days prior to the conference call, to compute a 
baseline measure for each variable. To prevent the 30-minute pre-event measure from 
reflecting variations in trading activity that occur throughout the trading day, we measure the 
30-minute trading window that corresponds to the conference call for each of the 45 pre-event 
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 This measure is similar to measures used by several prior studies that examine market reaction to conference 
calls (e.g. Frankel, Johnson and Skinner (1998), Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller (2003, 2004)).  
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trading days. We then compute abnormal RANGE, VOLATIL, and VOL variables (ARANGE, 
AVOLATIL, and AVOL, respectively) by subtracting the pre-event measure from the event 
measure and dividing the result by the pre-event measure. Thus, ARANGE, AVOLATIL, and 
AVOL represent the abnormal stock activity in a percentage form.
17
  
We measure several control variables that likely relate to the market reaction to the 
conference call: the absolute value of the realized earnings surprise (ABSURP), the level of 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts for FY2005 Q4 (DISPERQ4), and the level of 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts for FY2006 (DISPER06), firm size (LMV), the 
number of words in the press release (PRLENGTH), and the number of words in the 
presentation portion of the conference call (CCLENGTH). The first four control variables 
capture the firm’s information environment at the time of the earnings announcement, and the 
last two control variables proxy for the level of disclosure about past (realized) performance 
or non-management guidance information not captured by other control variables. 
3.2 Materiality results 
Table 5 reports univariate statistics partitioned on the level of CCONLYSCORE. “High 
CCONLYSCORE,” the left-hand group of columns, represents firms with a level of 
CCONLYSCORE above the sample median CCONLYSCORE, while “Low CCONLYSCORE,” 
the middle columns, represents firms with a level of CCONLYSCORE at or below the median. 
The right-hand columns show tests of differences in the mean and median. Note that the 
number of observations in the “High” and “Low” groups is unequal because multiple 
observations have a CCONLYSCORE equal to the median. 
We use the three market measures, ARANGE, AVOLATIL, and AVOL, to triangulate on the 
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 In untabulated analyses we find that multivariate results are qualitatively unaffected and inferences are 
unchanged when we use RANGE and VOLATIL instead of ARANGE and AVOLATIL. 
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materiality of the guidance disclosed in the call. ARANGE and AVOLATIL reflect abnormal 
stock price movement that occurs during the conference call, while AVOL captures abnormal 
trading volume. We expect these variables to be larger for the “High” CCONLYSCORE group 
than the “Low” group. 
We measure the control variables as follows: ABSURP is realized earnings less the First 
Call consensus forecast immediately preceding the earnings announcement, scaled by stock 
price at the beginning of the fourth quarter. DISPERQ4 (DISPER06) is the standard deviation 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts listed in First Call immediately preceding the earnings 
announcement for the fourth quarter of FY2005 (for the year of FY2006), scaled by stock 
price at the beginning of the fourth quarter. LMV is the log of the firm’s market value of 
equity, measured at the beginning of the fourth quarter. PRLENGTH and CCLENGTH are the 
word counts of the press release and the presentation portion of the conference call, 
respectively. 
Results in Table 5 show that the variables of interest, ARANGE, AVOLATIL, and AVOL 
are higher among the “High CCONLYSCORE” firms than the “Low CCONLYSCORE” firms, 
but only AVOL is significantly so. Among the remaining variables in Table 5, PRLENGTH 
and CCLENGTH are significantly different between groups, while other variables are not 
significantly different.  
Multiple information signals drive investors’ trading at the time of an earnings 
announcement, so a multivariate framework is well suited to isolate the effect of disclosure on 
trading. We thus use the following regression model to test for the materiality of new 
guidance disclosed in the conference call: 
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MKTREACT  = 0 + 1CCONLYSCORE + 2PRSCORE + 3ABSURP + 4DISPERQ4 + 
5DISPER06 + 6LMV + 7PRLENGTH + 8CCLENGTH + ε  (1) 
where: 
MKTREACT  = The firm’s market reaction during the 30-minute period that begins at 
the conference call’s initiation, measured by 1) ARANGE, 2) 
AVOLATIL, and 3) AVOL. 
The independent variable of primary interest is CCONLYSCORE. A significantly positive 
coefficient on CCONLYSCORE would indicate that the guidance disclosed only in the 
conference call is material. PRSCORE in the regression captures delayed trading related to 
guidance that firms disclose in the press release and we predict its coefficient to be positive. 
The remaining variables are included to control for other drivers of trading activity during the 
conference call window.  
Table 6 presents results of Equation (1). We estimate the regression with 1) all 348 firms 
hosting a conference call during normal trading hours and 2) the 323 of those 348 firms that 
are NYSE-listed. Using the NYSE-only subsample enables a focus on firms explicitly 
prohibited from making material new disclosures in their conference calls.  
Results for the full sample of 348 firms show that the intensity of conference call-only 
guidance is significantly associated with both the abnormal stock price trading range and 
volatility during the 30-minute measurement period of the conference call. For the ARANGE 
(AVOLATIL) regression, CCONLYSCORE has a t-statistic of 2.71 (2.39). The level of 
exclusive conference call disclosure is also significantly associated with abnormal trading 
volume during the 30-minute period: in the AVOL regression, CCONLYSCORE has a t-
statistic of 1.99.  
Results on the right-hand side of Table 6 show that similar results are obtained among the 
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subset of 323 NYSE-listed firms: the t-statistics on CCSCOREONLY in the ARANGE, 
AVOLATIL, and AVOL regressions are 2.31, 2.04, and 1.64, respectively. 
Among the regression model’s non-primary variables, the significantly positive 
coefficients on PRSCORE in the two regression estimates among the subset of NYSE firms in 
Table 6 indicate that investors trade on information first released in the press release during 
the 30-minute conference call window. The negative coefficients on the control variable LMV 
in all regression estimates are consistent with larger firms enjoying richer information 
environments and thus having less “fresh” news revealed at the earnings announcement. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 6 indicate the management guidance that firms 
provide exclusively in their conference calls is indeed material because investors react and 
trade on this information. It is noteworthy that these results hold in the subsample comprised 
of firms subject to NYSE’s press-release-only policy.18 While generally it can be difficult for 
managers to judge whether any given piece of information is material, managers can easily 
disclose no new management forecasts in the presentation portion of the conference call by 
simply disclosing all guidance in the press release first. Hence, the results in Table 6 reflect 
managers’ decision to provide management guidance exclusively in the conference call. 
 
4. Determinants of Conference Call Venue  
Given that firms release material new management guidance in their conference calls, we 
now examine the costs and benefits of making disclosures exclusively through the conference 
call venue. 
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 These results should not be interpreted to mean that management guidance is the only material disclosure in 
conference calls, nor that conference calls disclosing no management guidance contain zero material 
information. Rather, the tests pinpoint management guidance as a specific type of material disclosure contained 
in conference calls. 
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4.1 Hypotheses and prior research 
Reg FD states that the determination of which communication method satisfies the “public 
disclosure” requirement should take into account the degree that the investment community 
follows a firm’s different disclosure venues. If a firm discloses material information by way of 
submitting a press release to the major wire services (or, alternatively, filing a Form 8-K), it 
fulfills its obligation for “public disclosure.” On the other hand, if a firm makes new material 
disclosures in a conference call, the firm is at risk that the SEC will subsequently judge its 
conference call to have violated Reg FD because it did not reach a sufficiently wide 
immediate audience of investors. Thus, relying exclusively on the conference call for 
information dissemination is potentially costly. This cost will vary by firm according to how 
much investor attention a firm’s conference calls garner.  
As a result, we expect the disclosure of new material management guidance in conference 
calls will decrease as the call’s visibility decreases. We cannot, however, directly observe the 
number of people who listen live to the conference calls in our sample. It stands to reason, 
however, that firms with lower general investor visibility also have conference calls that reach 
a narrower immediate audience. We thus proxy for conference call visibility with a measure 
of general investor visibility. Following prior literature, we measure firm visibility using the 
firm’s average share turnover. Merton (1987) theoretically demonstrates an inverse 
relationship between investor recognition and liquidity, and Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelegrin 
(2001), Kaniel, Li, and Starks (2003), and Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find 
empirical evidence that higher investor visibility is associated with higher liquidity. Firm 
visibility, SHTURN, is measured as the mean monthly share turnover scaled by the mean 
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number of shares outstanding over the 12-month period of the fiscal year 2005.
19
  
Litigation risk influences firms’ disclosure decisions (Skinner 1997; Field, Lowry, and 
Shu 2005). Bamber and Cheon (1998) find litigation risk specifically relates to venue choice. 
We predict that firms in high litigation risk industries, LITIG, are less likely to use the 
conference call venue due to Reg FD. Following Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994), 
LITIG is an indicator variable equaling one when the firm’s SIC code is in biotechnology 
(2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), 
and retail (5200-5961) industries. 
We expect that NYSE firms will provide a smaller fraction of their total disclosure only in 
their conference call to comply with the Timely Alert Policy. The indicator variable NYSE 
captures the mean difference in aptitude that NYSE-listed firms have for exclusive conference 
call disclosure as compared to non-NYSE firms. 
A firm’s information environment at the time of the earnings announcement may affect its 
reliance on the conference call for guidance disclosure. Managers may fear that investors will 
misinterpret or be confused by their management guidance (Weber 2000). We expect that 
managers prefer to provide guidance for complex forecasting situations in the conference call 
venue because they can provide detailed information in context and immediately field 
analysts’ questions. ABSURP, the degree to which a firm’s analyst consensus earnings 
forecast differs from its realized earnings, is a measure of the amount of information 
asymmetry between the firm and the market just before the earnings release. Relatedly, high 
analyst forecast dispersion is an indication of difficulty in predicting future performance for 
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 Since Reg RD became effective in October 2000, the SEC has targeted fewer than ten firms for investigation 
of a potential Reg FD violation, and, according to our conversations with an official from the SEC, none of these 
ten specifically involved a conference call disclosure. The threat of Reg FD enforcement action, however, has 
unequivocally caused firms to change their disclosure policies (e.g., Bushee et al. 2004). 
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analysts and managers alike (Ajinkya et al. 2005). Hence, we expect that the proportion of 
guidance disclosed exclusively in the conference call increases 1) as the magnitude of realized 
FY2005 Q4 unexpected earnings increases and 2) as management forecast dispersion for the 
FY2006 horizon increases. The standard deviation analysts’ earnings forecasts for FY2006 
immediately prior to the earnings announcement, DISPER06, proxies for the difficulty in 
forecasting future performance.  
Prior research documents a relation both between institutional ownership and disclosure 
(Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Bushee and Noe 2000; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 
2005) and between analyst following and disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy et al. 
1999). Firms with a high number of institutional owners and high analyst following may cater 
to these influential stakeholders by providing a greater proportion of earnings announcement 
guidance in the conference call alone, since the conference call is the venue that is specifically 
geared toward these groups. Likewise, institutions and analysts may be attracted to firms that 
provide a greater proportion of exclusive management guidance disclosure in the conference 
call. Thus, we expect exclusive conference call disclosure to increase in the number of 
institutional owners, NUMIO, and in analyst following, NUMEST.  We obtain NUMIO from 
CDA Spectrum for the event quarter.
20
 NUMEST is measured as the number of analysts whose 
earnings estimates for the event year are included in the last First Call consensus compiled 
before the fiscal year 2005 earnings announcement. 
At times, firms make available annual earnings guidance for a given fiscal year before the 
prior fiscal year’s realized earnings have been released. The legal duty to update management 
guidance is debated among legal experts (Tucker 2007). The SEC’s and the NYSE’s stated 
                                                     
20
 Empirical results are similar when percent of total shares outstanding owned by institutions is used instead of 
the number of institutional owners. 
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positions that press releases reach the broadest audience may motivate firms to use the press 
release venue to update their guidance to ensure regulatory compliance. Moreover, Reg FD 
states, “We also caution issuers that a deviation from their usual practices for making public 
disclosure may affect our judgment as to whether the method they have chosen in a particular 
case was reasonable.” Therefore, if a firm previously disclosed guidance in a press release, the 
firm has regulatory pressure to use the press release venue if it updates that guidance. We 
identify firms that had disclosed a FY2006 earnings forecasts preceding the fiscal year-end 
2005 earnings announcement from the Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) database. 
PREVIOUS is a dummy variable equaling one if CIG indicates the firm had issued earnings 
guidance for fiscal year 2006 before the issuance of the fiscal year 2005 press release.
21
  
Non-professional investors may have a lower aptitude to listen live to a conference call 
when the call is held during trading hours (Bushee et al. 2004). Firms choose the time of day 
to host their conference calls and they typically maintain the same start time for their call each 
quarter. Hence, firms hosting their conference calls during non-trading hours, AFTERHRS, 
may rely more or less heavily on the conference call venue for exclusive disclosure. We 
measure AFTERHRS to control for such an effect.  
Lastly, we measure firm size, LMV, and the market-to-book ratio, MB, to control for other 
determinants of guidance production. MB is measured at the end of fiscal year 2005. 
In this section, we are most interested in firms’ choice to shift disclosure from the press 
release to the conference call. We therefore use the proportion of total management guidance 
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The CIG database only comprehensively covers management forecasts of earnings, and not management 
forecasts of other, non-earnings guidance, such as revenue or gross margin forecasts. We use PREVIOUS as a 
proxy for whether the firm had disclosed any management guidance for FY2006 before the earnings 
announcement. It is possible for a firm to have previously disclosed management guidance of a line item other 
than earnings, but not earnings itself (i.e., a firm provides a revenue forecast but not an earnings forecast). 
However, Lansford, Lev, and Tucker (2009) find it is uncommon for a firm to provide line-item forecasts other 
than earnings without providing an earnings forecast itself. 
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disclosed exclusively in the conference call, PROPORT, in our tests.  
4.2 Venue results 
Table 7, Panel A reports univariate statistics partitioned on the level of PROPORT. “High 
PROPORT,” the left-hand group of columns, represents firms with a level of PROPORT 
above the sample median PROPORT, while “Low PROPORT,” the middle columns, 
represents firms with a level of PROPORT at or below the median. The right-hand columns 
show tests of differences in the mean and median.  
The variables SHTURN, ABSURP, DISPER06, and PREVIOUS are significantly different 
in the predicted directions between the “High” and “Low PROPORT” groups. The remaining 
variables in Table 7, Panel A are not significantly different between groups. We highlight that 
the variable NYSE is insignificantly different between the “High PROPORT” and the “Low 
PROPORT” groups, meaning that, in spite of the NYSE’s press-release-only policy, we do not 
find evidence that NYSE-listed firms rely more on press releases than non-NYSE listed firms.  
We use the following regression to examine the determinants of the proportion of new 
management guidance disclosed in the conference call: 
PROPORT  =  0 + 1SHTURN + 2LITIG + 3NYSE + 4ABSURP + 5DISPER06 + 
6NUMIO + 7NUMEST + 8PREVIOUS + 9AFTERHRS + 10LMV + 
11MB +   (2) 
From the initial sample of 372 observations with a defined value of PROPORT, we 
eliminate eight observations that lack institutional ownership data on the CDA Spectrum 
database and three observations with negative values of MB. We thus estimate Equation (2) 
using 361 observations. We implement Equation (2) using Papke and Wooldrige (1996)’s 
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GLM procedure for dealing with proportional dependant variables.
22
 Table 8 reports the 
results of Equation (2), which we discuss below. 
SHTURN, the proxy of firm visibility, is significantly positive (t-stat=2.78). This result is 
consistent with firms complying with Reg FD by relying less on the conference call when the 
firm, and presumably also the firm’s conference call, receives less attention. Additionally, 
LITIG is significantly negative (t-stat=-3.54), which is consistent with firms that bear high 
litigation risk being especially sensitive to satisfying regulatory requirements.  
On the other hand, the coefficient on NYSE is insignificant (t-stat=0.62). Despite NYSE’s 
prohibition on material information disclosure exclusively in the conference call, we find no 
evidence that NYSE-listed firms have a lower propensity to disclose management guidance 
exclusively in the conference call venue.   
As predicted, the coefficient on ABSURP is significantly positive (t-stat=2.12) and 
DISPER06 has a significantly positive coefficient (t-stat=1.88).
23
 These results are consistent 
with managers providing a greater proportion of guidance in the conference call when the 
forecasting environment is more difficult, likely because the conference call provides 
managers greater opportunity to put the guidance into context and because managers can 
immediately field the conference call participants’ questions.  
NUMIO (t-stat=0.65) and NUMEST (t-stat=0.75) have insignificant coefficients. We thus 
find no evidence that either institutional investors or analysts influence management venue 
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 Unlike binary dependent variables, fractional dependent variables take the values in the interval [0,1] and 
hence logit and probit models are inappropriate. Papke and Wooldrige (1996) suggest a quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimator (QMLE) that can be implemented using a GLM procedure. 
23
 The effect of unexpected realized earnings may vary according to good and bad news. Matsumoto et al. (2007) 
find that firms’ conference calls focus more on the future when reported firm performance is good. Hence, in 
sensitivity analyses, we dichotomize earnings surprise in non-negative unexpected earnings, POSSURP, and 
negative unexpected earnings, NEGSURP, and include both variables in Equation (2). Though POSSURP and 
NEGSURP are significant in the expected directions (t-stats=2.09 and -1.56, respectively), the coefficients are 
not significantly different from each other. 
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choice. 
The coefficient on PREVIOUS is significantly negative (t-stat=-3.52), as predicted, 
indicating that firms that previously disclosed earnings guidance rely more on the press 
release venue.  
Finally, the coefficients on control variables AFTERHRS, LMV and MB are insignificant. 
Collectively, regression results indicate that firms consider the tradeoff in costs and 
benefits of exclusive conference call disclosure.  
 
5. Analyst Reaction According to Venue 
In the final set of analyses, we examine whether the disclosure venue affects analysts’ 
interpretation of the management guidance.  
5.1 The conference call venue’s target audience  
Though open to all interested parties, conference calls are geared toward analysts and 
sophisticated investors. For example, Duke Energy Corp.’s FY2005 Q4 press release states, 
“An earnings conference call for analysts is scheduled for 10 a.m. ET today…” and Johnson 
& Johnson’s FY2005 Q4 press release states, “Johnson & Johnson will conduct a meeting 
with financial analysts to discuss this news release today at 8:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time” 
(italics added).  
Using survey data from the FAF Report, Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that analysts 
perceive firms that use analyst meetings to disseminate management guidance as having 
superior disclosure policies than those of other firms. Bamber and Cheon write, “…analysts 
prefer managers to issue specific earnings forecasts that are disclosed first to the analysts 
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themselves.” Analysts’ preference for direct communication with management may be due to 
their belief that management guidance is more credible when released in the conference call 
due to the potential for immediate and direct analyst scrutiny (Hirst et al. 2008). We thus 
examine whether analysts react to management guidance differently according to venue.  
5.2 Analyst reaction results 
We test whether disclosure venue is associated with the absolute change in the consensus 
analyst earnings forecast and the change in analyst forecast dispersion around the earnings 
announcement. Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) document that the majority of analysts 
following a firm issue a forecast within the 14-day window following a quarterly earnings 
announcement. We thus use a short 7-calendar-day measurement window so that we can best 
detect analysts’ revision behavior that stems from news at the time of the earnings 
announcement.
24
  
We compute the change in both the level and dispersion in the consensus analyst forecast, 
measured from immediately before the earnings announcement to 7 days after the earnings 
announcement. The absolute mean change in the consensus forecast, ABMEANCHG, and the 
median change, ABMEDCHG, are both scaled by price. The change in dispersion, 
DISPERCHG, is the percent change in the forecast dispersion, which is measured by the 
standard deviation of forecasts.  
To pinpoint how the venue of management guidance affects analysts’ response to the 
guidance, it is critical to control for total information disclosed at the earnings announcement. 
We therefore measure several proxies of information: the absolute value of the abnormal 
return in the 3-day window surrounding the press release (ABRET), the absolute realized 
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 In unreported analysis, we find that results are qualitatively similar and inferences unchanged when using a 14-
calendar-day window. 
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earnings surprise (ABSURP), whether the firm had a negative earnings surprise (MISS), and 
the absolute forecast surprise (ABGUIDESURP). We also allow the coefficient of ABSURP to 
vary according to the sign of realized earnings surprise (MISS*ABSURP). 
As in section 4, the variable of primary interest is the proportion of total management 
guidance disclosed exclusively in the conference call, PROPORT. We expect that analysts 
react more to news disclosed in the conference call given that 1) analysts have the opportunity 
to clarify and ask questions and 2) managers may be better able to relate their expectations in 
context in the conference call. We also expect analyst uncertainty surrounding future earnings 
expectations to decrease when a greater proportion of management guidance is disclosed 
exclusively in the conference call.  
Table 7, Panel B reports univariate comparisons of High PROPORT and Low PROPORT 
for the incremental variables defined in section 5. The absolute mean change in the consensus 
forecast is significantly different between the “High” and “Low” groups, while the absolute 
median change and the change in forecast dispersion are not significantly different. Among 
the three control variables, values are generally insignificantly different between the two 
groups. 
We estimate the following regression to test whether the proportion of total earnings 
announcement management guidance disclosed in the conference call is associated with 
analysts’ reaction. We are careful to include several controls to capture analysts’ reaction to 
the information itself: 
CHGFORCST  = 0 + 1PROPORT + 2ABRET + 3ABSURP + 4MISS  
  + 5MISS*ABSURP +6ABGUIDESURP + 7LMV + 8MB +    (3) 
where: 
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CHGFORCST  = The change in the analyst consensus forecast, as reported in the First 
Call database, measured by 1) ABMEANCHG, 2) ABMEDCHG, and 3) 
DISPERCHG. 
 
The predicted coefficient on PROPORT is positive (negative) for the regressions having 
dependent variables of ABMEANCHG and ABMEDCHG (DISPERCHG). Table 9 reports 
regression results. The coefficient on PROPORT is significant in the predicted direction in the 
regressions with dependent variables ABMEANCHG and ABMEDCHG (t-stats=2.07, 3.03, 
respectively). However, PROPORT’s coefficient is not statistically significant in the 
regression with DISPERCHG (t-stat=-0.50).
25
 Therefore, the exclusive disclosure of 
management guidance in the conference call venue is associated with analysts’ interpretation 
of the guidance, but we do not find a significant relationship between disclosure venue and 
disparity of beliefs among analysts. 
 
 6. Sensitivity Analyses of Guidance Intensity Measures 
We perform sensitivity analyses to establish the robustness of the primary results to 
alternate methods of computing CCONLYSCORE and PRSCORE. As detailed below, we find 
inferences for the multivariate analyses are unchanged. 
6.1 Including “Soft” forecasts 
We re-compute PRSCORE and CCONLYSCORE including qualitative guidance. We 
judge such “soft” guidance to be substantially less informative than point and range guidance 
and thus adjust the score awarded to qualitative guidance by halving score assignment in 
listed Table 1. For example, a qualitative earnings disclosure is awarded 5 points. 
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 In untabulated analyses we find that multivariate results are qualitatively unaffected and inferences are 
unchanged when we exclude the abnormal return variable, ABRET, from the regression. Likewise, results are 
qualitatively unaffected when we use raw returns instead of market-adjusted returns. 
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Untablulated results including “soft” guidance to Equation (1) are qualitatively similar to 
the primary results. The significance levels on the CCONLYSCORE coefficients retain their 
same level (1%, 5%, or 10%) as in the original regression. Estimates of Equation (2) remain 
materially unchanged as well (untabulated). The coefficients (t-stats) are 0.067 (2.66) on 
SHTURN, -0.107 (-2.97) on LITIG, 18.159 (2.77) on ABSURP, 9.637 (2.88) on DISPER06, 
and -0.127 (-2.97) on PREVIOUS. The other independent variables remain insignificant. 
Finally, the results from Equation (3) also remain quite similar: t-stats for the PROPORT 
coefficient are 2.67, 3.32, and -0.69, respectively. 
6.2 Frequency counts 
We next compute CCONLYSCORE and PRSCORE based on simple counts of items of 
management guidance. That is, instead of assigning a weight corresponding to the importance 
of each category of guidance and then adjusting that weight by the precision of the forecast, 
we simply assign 1 point to each category. 
Untabulated results to Equation (1) using count scores are qualitatively similar to the 
original regression results. Specifically, the significance on CCONLYSCORE is at the same 
level (i.e., 1%, 5%, or 10%) or better in all regression specifications. Results to Equation (2) 
are also qualitatively similar. The coefficients (t-stats) are 0.080 (2.94) on SHTURN, -0.106 (-
3.46) on LITIG, 18.645 (2.18) on ABSURP, 10.758 (2.35) on DISPER06, and -0.123 (-3.46) 
on PREVIOUS. The other independent variables remain insignificant. Finally, results of 
Equation (3) are nearly identical.  The t-stats on PROPORT are 2.08, 3.07, and -0.64, 
respectively. 
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7. Conclusion 
Skinner (2003) writes, “…it seems natural that there would be an interaction between 
managers’ decisions about what to disclose and how they choose to disclose it” (p. 186). 
Disclosure venue, however, has received surprisingly scant attention in existing academic 
literature. In this study, we identify management forecasts as a specific source of new material 
information disclosed in the conference calls by directly examining the immediate market 
reaction to its release. We find robust evidence that investors respond to these disclosures and 
that firms’ use of the conference call as a primary source of information dissemination stems 
from a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account information content and regulatory 
compliance. We also find that disclosure venue has tangible ramifications: analysts react more 
strongly to management guidance made exclusively through the conference call venue.  
Reg FD’s intent is to protect small investors, who represent the class of investors arguably 
least likely to adopt of new technologies. Hence, Reg FD and the NYSE originally took a 
conservative view toward disclosure venue by strongly advocating (and even requiring) the 
use of the traditional press release. Despite the SEC’s and NYSE’s regulatory pressure, this 
study documents that a substantial amount of exclusive conference call disclosure already 
exists in a fiscal year 2005 sample. Reliance on non-press release venues, including 
conference calls, webcasts, and firms’ investor relations websites, will almost certainly 
increase in the coming years in the wake of recent regulation changes, such as an August 2008 
SEC interpretive guidance that permits (albeit in very limited circumstances) the use of firms’ 
websites for material new disclosure. The importance of disclosure venue is thus likely to 
increase over the coming years as regulations further evolve to reflect the ubiquity of the 
Internet.  
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APPENDIX A 
Excerpt from “Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading” (Reg FD) 
b. Alternative Methods of Public Disclosure 
We are recognizing alternative methods of public disclosure to give issuers the flexibility to 
choose another method (or a combination of methods) of disclosure that will achieve the goal 
of effecting broad, non-exclusionary distribution of information to the public. 
As a general matter, acceptable methods of public disclosure for purposes of Regulation FD 
will include press releases distributed through a widely circulated news or wire service, or 
announcements made through press conferences or conference calls that interested members 
of the public may attend or listen to either in person, by telephonic transmission, or by other 
electronic transmission (including use of the Internet). The public must be given adequate 
notice of the conference or call and the means for accessing it. The regulation does not require 
use of a particular method, or establish a “one size fits all” standard for disclosure; rather, it 
leaves the decision to the issuer to choose methods that are reasonably calculated to make 
effective, broad, and non-exclusionary public disclosure, given the particular circumstances of 
that issuer. Indeed, we have modified the language of the regulation to note that the issuer 
may use a method “or combination of methods” of disclosure, in recognition of the fact that it 
may not always be possible or desirable for an issuer to rely on a single method of disclosure 
as reasonably designed to effect broad public disclosure.  
We believe that issuers could use the following model, which employs a combination of 
methods of disclosure, for making a planned disclosure of material information, such as a 
scheduled earnings release:  
 First, issue a press release, distributed through regular channels, containing 
the information;  
 Second, provide adequate notice, by a press release and/or website posting, of 
a scheduled conference call to discuss the announced results, giving investors 
both the time and date of the conference call, and instructions on how to access 
the call; and  
 Third, hold the conference call in an open manner, permitting investors to 
listen in either by telephonic means or through Internet webcasting.  
By following these steps, an issuer can use the press release to provide the initial broad 
distribution of the information, and then discuss its release with analysts in the subsequent 
conference call, without fear that if it should disclose additional material details related to the 
original disclosure it will be engaging in a selective disclosure of material information. We 
note that several issuer commenters indicated that many companies already follow this or a 
similar model for making planned disclosures.  
 
(Note: full text of regulation available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.  
Italics added for emphasis.)
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APPENDIX B 
 
(Note: full text of letter available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/CKinneyLetter.pdf )
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APPENDIX C 
 
.... [non-germane section omitted] 
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.... [non-germane section omitted] 
  
(Note: full text of letter available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/FINAL_Annual%20FPI%20letter_2009_1_30_09.pdf)
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APPENDIX D 
Example of Management Guidance Disclosure in the Press Release and Conference Call 
 
Nordstrom, Inc.’s FY 2006 Q4 earnings announcement 
 
Press Release: 
“…For the fiscal year ending February 3, 2007 [“fiscal year 2006”], the company anticipates 
diluted earnings per share in the range of $2.15 to $2.23, which includes an estimated expense 
of $0.06 per diluted share from the adoption of SFAS No. 123(R) regarding expensing of 
stock options.…”  
Conference Call: 
“…As far as our Outlook for [fiscal year] 2006, we are currently forecasting earnings per 
share in the range of $2.15 to $2.23 for the full year, a 12% to 16% increase over last year, 
after normalizing the $0.06 impact for stock option expense. This range assumes low single 
digit same-store sales growth throughout the year. In addition, we expect sales leverage on 
buying and occupancy costs to drive 25 to 35 basis points of annual gross margin expansion. 
We also anticipate an SG&A expense rate decline of 30 to 40 basis points, primarily from 
sales leverage on fixed expenses.   
This rate improvement is on a comparable basis to last year, excluding stock option expense. 
Interest expense should decline $8 million to $10 million and credit card revenue is assumed 
to increase $25 million to $30 million. As a reminder, our capital plan for the coming year is 
approximately $300 million, net of developer reimbursement, 40% of which will be spent on 
new stores, 30% is earmarked for store remodels, and 15% for technology. The remainder is 
for maintenance and general corporate purposes. Depreciation will likely be around $290 
million for the full year.…”  
Note that we do not code Nordstrom’s or any other firm’s stock option expense forecast since 
the adoption of SFAS 123(R) caused many firms to provide this particular forecast only in the 
short period surrounding its adoption. Also note that Nordstrom’s CCONLYSCORE does not 
include points for an earnings forecast, since the firm first disclosed this item in the press 
release. 
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APPENDIX E 
Variables Definition 
ABMEANCHG  The absolute value of the difference between the mean consensus forecast 
immediately preceding the earnings announcement date and the mean 
consensus forecast 7 calendar days after the earnings announcement date, 
scaled by stock price at the beginning of the fourth quarter. 
ABMEDCHG  The absolute value of the difference between the median consensus 
forecast immediately preceding the earnings announcement date and the 
median consensus forecast 7 calendar days after the earnings 
announcement date, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the fourth 
quarter. 
ABRET The absolute value of the firm’s cumulative abnormal returns measured 
over the window -1 to +1, where day 0 is the earnings announcement date, 
or, in cases where the press release is issued after normal market hours, day 
0 is the following trading day. Abnormal returns are computed as the 
difference between the firm’s daily returns and the value-weighted market 
returns including dividends (VWRETD).  
ABSURP The absolute value of the realized reported earnings surprise for the fourth 
quarter of FY2005, measured as the difference between reported earnings 
and First Call’s consensus forecast immediately preceding the earnings 
announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the fourth quarter. 
ABGUIDESURP The absolute value of the difference between the prevailing analyst mean 
consensus forecast and the management guidance for fiscal year 2007 
issued at the earnings announcement obtained from First Call’s Company 
Issued Guidelines database, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the 
fourth quarter. Management guidance is defined as the point estimate for 
point forecasts, the mid-point of lower and upper bound for range forecasts, 
and the lower (upper) point estimate for lower (upper) bound for minimum 
(maximum) open-ended forecasts. This variable takes a value of zero when 
no management forecast is issued at the earnings announcement. 
AFTERHRS An indicator variable equaling one if the firm’s conference call begins 
outside of normal trading hours, 9:30 am to 4:00 pm EST, and equaling 
zero otherwise. 
AVOL   The abnormal trading volume, measured during the 30-minute window that 
begins when the conference calls starts. 
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ARANGE The abnormal range in stock price, measured during the 30-minute window 
that begins when the conference calls starts. 
AVOLATIL   The abnormal coefficient of variation in stock price, measured during the 
30-minute window that begins when the conference calls starts. 
CCLENGTH The number of words in the presentation portion of the firm’s conference 
call. 
CCONLYSCORE The sum of points from management guidance items disclosed exclusively 
in the conference call. 
DISPER06 The standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts listed in First Call for 
FY2006 immediately preceding the earnings announcement, scaled by 
stock price at the beginning of the fourth quarter. 
DISPERCHG  The percentage difference between the consensus forecast dispersion 
immediately before the earnings announcement date and the consensus 
forecast dispersion 7 calendar days after the earnings announcement date. 
DISPERQ4 The standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts listed in First Call for 
the fourth quarter of FY2005 immediately preceding the earnings 
announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the fourth quarter. 
LITIG Indicator variable equaling one when firm’s industry membership is in 
biotechnology (2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (3570-3577 and 
7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retail (5200-5961) industries and 
equaling zero otherwise (based on Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994). 
LMV The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity, measured at the 
beginning of the fourth quarter. 
MB The market-to-book ratio, measured at the fiscal year end of 2005. 
MISS A dummy variable equaling one if the firm’s realized earnings for fiscal 
year 2005 are below the prevailing analyst consensus forecast at the time of 
the earnings announcement and equaling zero otherwise. 
NUMEST The number of analysts whose earnings estimates for FY2005 Q4 are 
included in the First Call consensus compiled before the earnings 
announcement for the event year.  
NUMIO The number of institutional owners reported for the event quarter, obtained 
from CDA Spectrum. 
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NYSE An indicator variable equaling one if the firm is listed on the NYSE 
exchange and equaling zero otherwise. 
PREVIOUS An indicator variable equaling one if the CIG database shows the firm has 
issued earnings guidance for fiscal year 2006 before the fiscal year 2005 
earnings announcement date and equaling zero otherwise. 
PRLENGTH The number of words in the firm’s press release. 
PROPORT The proportion of total earnings announcement score that the firm discloses 
exclusively in the conference call (CCONLYSCORE / TOTALSCORE). 
PRSCORE The sum of points from management guidance items disclosed in the press 
release. 
PRONLYSCORE The sum of points from management guidance items disclosed exclusively 
in the press release. 
PRTOCCMINS The number of minutes elapsed from the press release time stamp to the 
beginning of the conference call. 
SHTURN The mean monthly share turnover scaled by the mean number of shares 
outstanding over the 12-month period of fiscal year 2005. 
TOTALSCORE The sum of points from non-redundant management guidance items 
disclosed across the press release and the conference call (PRSCORE + 
CCONLYSCORE). 
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TABLE 1 
Forward-looking Disclosures and Scoring Mechanism 
Category Disclosure Type 
Point 
Assignment 
Earnings GAAP or pro-forma earnings 10 
Revenue Revenue or comparable store sales 9 
Cash flow Cash flows 8 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Capital expenditures 7 
  Gross margin 7 
  Operating margin 7 
Recurring Cost 
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses 
4 
 R&D expense 4 
 Depreciation expense 3 
  Amortization expense 3 
  Interest expense 3 
  Tax expense or effective tax rate 3 
 
This table lists the points assigned to quantify the level (“score”) of management guidance 
disclosure in the earnings announcement press release and the presentation portion of the 
conference call of the S&P 500 firms’ fiscal year 2005 earnings announcements. The final sample 
consists of 451 firm-observations. 
Notes: 
1. “Earnings” includes forecasts of dollar earnings (earnings or earnings 
per share), as well as earnings growth.  
2. “Revenue” includes forecasts of dollar revenue and revenue growth. 
3. “Cash flow” includes operating cash flows and free cash flows. 
4. The score listed in the table relates to scoring of range forecasts. For 
point forecasts, we add an additional point. 
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TABLE 2 
Management Guidance Frequency by Category 
Forecast Type 
#  
PR 
# CC 
Only 
# 
Total 
Both 
Earnings 219 36 255 77.3% 
Revenue 105 49 154 55.8% 
Cash flows 46 39 85 44.7% 
Capital expenditures 70 105 175 27.4% 
Gross margin 14 37 51 19.6% 
Operating margin 21 42 63 22.2% 
Selling, general, and administrative expenses 16 39 55 16.4% 
R&D expense 15 17 32 34.4% 
Depreciation expense 23 41 64 15.6% 
Amortization expense 21 8 29 34.5% 
Interest expense 25 40 65 15.4% 
Tax expense or tax effective rate 57 131 188 22.3% 
 
This table provides guidance disclosure frequency by category across the press release and 
conference call disclosure venues among 451 sample firms. “# PR” is the count of each category’s 
disclosure in the earnings announcement press release. “# CC Only” is the count of each 
category’s disclosure exclusively in the presentation portion of the earnings announcement 
conference call. “# Total” refers to the count of the category’s disclosure frequency unconditional 
of venue. “Both” indicates instances of firms disclosing the category in both the press release and 
conference call, expressed as a percentage of the “# Total”. 
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TABLE 3 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev.    
First 
Quartile Median 
Third 
Quartile n 
NYSE 0.845     451 
CCONLYSCORE 8 10.1 0 4 12 451 
PRSCORE 11 12.3 0 10 19 451 
PRONLYSCORE 2 4.9 0 0 0 451 
TOTALSCORE 19 15.1 7 17 30 451 
PROPORT 0.477 0.405 0.000 0.418 1.000 372 
PRTOCCMINS 247.8 308.7 60.0 123.0 240.0 451 
PRLENGTH 1,685 1,261 931 1,394 2,097 451 
CCLENGTH 3,700 1,621 2,595 3,449 4,577 451 
AFTERHRS 0.228         451 
 
This table provides descriptive summary statistics for variables of interest. All variables are defined 
in Appendix E. 
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TABLE 4 
Pearson Correlations between Key Variables 
 
 
 
PR 
SCORE 
CC 
ONLY 
SCORE 
TOT
AL 
SCO
RE 
PRO 
POR
T 
AB 
SUR
P 
MISS 
DISP
ERQ
4 
DISP
ER06 
SH 
TUR
N 
NUM
IO 
NUM 
EST 
LITI
G 
PR     
LEN 
GTH 
CC  
LEN 
GTH 
PRSCORE               
CCONLYSCORE -0.135              
TOTALSCORE 0.729 0.580             
PROPORT -0.756 0.563 -0.252            
ABSURP -0.104 -0.027 -0.104 0.167           
MISS 0.015 -0.089 -0.049 -0.015 0.106          
DISPERQ4 -0.082 -0.010 -0.074 0.110 0.637 0.257         
DISPER06 -0.137 -0.010 -0.120 0.169 0.535 0.176 0.858        
SHTURN -0.147 0.040 -0.093 0.210 0.128 -0.019 0.133 0.197       
NUMIO -0.057 -0.009 -0.054 0.033 -0.127 0.063 -0.102 -0.077 -0.230      
NUMEST -0.028 0.000 -0.023 0.107 -0.017 0.046 -0.048 0.009 0.167 0.446     
LITIG 0.099 0.034 0.105 -0.011 0.025 -0.027 -0.007 0.056 0.273 0.102 0.306    
PRLENGTH 0.163 -0.175 0.013 -0.207 0.009 0.143 0.060 0.025 -0.171 0.224 0.098 -0.142   
CCLENGTH 0.073 0.260 0.240 0.104 0.088 0.095 0.114 0.056 -0.017 0.145 0.051 0.062 0.075  
 
This table provides pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients for key variables. Bolded coefficients represent significance at the 5% level or 
lower. All variables are defined in Appendix E. 
  
47 
TABLE 5 
Univariate Statistics for Market Reaction 
  High CCONLYSCORE  Low CCONLYSCORE  Between Group Test 
Variable  mean median n  mean median n  t-test Wilcoxon 
ARANGE  1.385 1.003 217 1.244 0.916 234 1.11 1.09 
AVOLATIL  1.290 0.907 217 1.172 0.821 234 0.88 0.99 
AVOL  3.654 2.251 217 2.957 1.788 234 1.85 
*
 1.83 
*
 
PRSCORE  1.853 0.000 217 2.342 0.000 234 -1.05 -0.97 
ABSURP  0.002 0.001 217 0.002 0.001 234 0.07 0.75 
DISPERQ4  0.001 0.000 217 0.001 0.001 234 0.04 -0.74 
DISPER06  0.004 0.002 217 0.005 0.002 234 -0.44 0.51 
LMV  9.364 9.300 217 9.473 9.442 234 -1.11 -1.41 
PRLENGTH  1,508 1,286 217 1,850 1,506 234 -2.90 
***
 -2.90 
***
 
CCLENGTH   3,975 3,601 217  3,444 3,244 234  3.52 
***
 3.43 
***
 
 
 
This table provides univariate statistics partitioned on the level of CCONLYSCORE. A firm’s 
CCONLYSCORE is classified as high if its CCONLYSCORE is greater than the sample median 
CCONLYSCORE, and as low otherwise.  ***, ** and * represent two-tailed statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix E. 
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TABLE 6 
Market Reaction to Management Guidance Disclosed in the Conference Call 
  (Exp. S&P 500  (Exp. NYSE Only 
Variable  sign) ARANGE   AVOLATIL   AVOL  sign) ARANGE   AVOLATIL   AVOL 
CONSTANT   3.113 
***
  2.631 
***
  5.866 
***
   3.234 
***
  2.733 
***
  5.047 
***
 
   (4.30)  (3.45)  (3.60)   (4.14)  (3.36)  (3.03) 
                     CCONLYSCORE (+) 0.023 ***  0.022 
***
  0.052 
**
  (+) 0.020 
**
  0.020 
**
  0.042 
*
 
   (2.71)  (2.39)  (1.99)   (2.31)  (2.04)  (1.64) 
                     PRSCORE  (+) 0.008  0.008  0.031  (+) 0.009 
*
  0.009  0.038 
*
 
   (1.25)  (1.17)  (1.27)   (1.31)  (1.24)  (1.42) 
                     ABSURP   -47.672  -42.446  110.16   -45.603  -40.152  96.082 
   (-1.54)  (-1.32)  (1.34)   (-1.48)  (-1.26)  (1.19) 
                     DISPERQ4   28.251  30.849  -234.102   13.203  17.594  -255.074 
   (0.47)  (0.47)  (-1.31)   (0.22)  (0.26)  (-1.40) 
                     DISPER06   -4.462  -3.498  10.768   2.060  2.239  19.226 
   (-0.24)  (-0.18)  (0.24)   (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.41) 
                     LMV   -0.206 
***
  -0.156 
**
  -0.369 
**
   -0.225 
***
  -0.172 
**
  -0.316 
*
 
   (-2.88)  (-2.03)  (-2.14)   (-2.92)  (-2.12)  (-1.77) 
                     PRLENGTH   0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.46)  (0.71)  (1.28)   (0.04)  (0.20)  (1.05) 
                     CCLENGTH   0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.38)  (0.88)  (0.22)   (0.35)  (0.93)  (0.25) 
                      
R
2
   7.13%   5.73%   5.79%   6.72%   5.27%   5.40% 
Observations     348     348     348      323     323     323  
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This table provides the empirical results of estimating equation (1). T-statistics computed using Huber-White robust standard errors, 
clustered on the 12 Fama-French (1997) industries, are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively, where significance is reported using a one-tailed test for coefficients with predicted signs and using a two-tailed test 
otherwise. Market reaction is measured using three methods over a 30-minute window that begins at the start of the conference call: 1) 
abnormal stock price range (ARANGE), 2) abnormal coefficient of variation in stock price (AVOLATIL), and 3) abnormal trading volume 
(AVOL).  Regressions are estimated using all firms hosting conference call during trading hours (“S&P 500”) and the subset of NYSE-listed 
firms (“NYSE Only”). The upper and lower 1% of the continuous independent variables are winsorized to mitigate the effect of outliers. All 
variables are defined in Appendix E. 
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TABLE 7 
Univariate Statistics for Venue Choice 
Panel A              
  High PROPORT  Low PROPORT  Between Group Test 
Variable  mean median n  mean median n  t-test Wilcoxon 
SHTURN  1.910 1.418 186 1.395 1.162 186 3.91 
***
 2.94 
***
 
LITIG  0.258 0.000 186 0.306 0.000 186 2= 1.07  
NYSE  0.839 1.000 186 0.855 1.000 186 2= 0.19  
ABSURP  0.002 0.001 186 0.001 0.001 186 3.10 
***
 1.69 
*
 
DISPER06  0.005 0.003 186 0.003 0.002 186 3.10 
***
 3.95 
***
 
NUMIO  448.0 373.0 181 433.2 369.0 183 0.61 0.32 
NUMEST  15.04 14.00 186 13.98 14.00 186 1.57 1.41 
PREVIOUS  0.210 0.000 186 0.301 0.000 186 2= 4.09**  
AFTERHRS  0.242 0.000 186 0.199 0.000 186 2= 1.00  
LMV  9.419 9.344 186 9.348 9.291 186 0.67 0.29 
MB   4.269 2.723 184  4.728 3.068 185  -0.56  -1.44  
              
Panel B               
  High PROPORT  Low PROPORT  Between Group Test 
Variable  mean median n  mean median n  t-test Wilcoxon 
ABSMEDIANCHG 0.003 0.001 182 0.002 0.001 180 1.61 0.84 
ABSMEANCHG  0.003 0.001 182 0.002 0.001 180 2.51 
**
 1.89 
*
 
DISPERCHG  -0.089 -0.114 182 -0.039 -0.111 180 -1.05 0.03 
ABRET  0.041 0.029 185 0.038 0.029 186 0.91 0.70 
MISS  0.237 0.000 186 0.258 0.000 186 2= 0.23  
ABGUIDENEWS   0.001 0.000 184  0.002 0.001 182  -1.49 
 
 -6.29 
***
 
 
This table provides univariate statistics partitioned on the level of PROPORT. A firm’s PROPORT is 
classified as high if its PROPORT is greater than the sample median PROPORT, and as low 
otherwise.  Observations used are the 372 firms with at least one management guidance disclosure 
(i.e., TOTALSCORE>0), though some variables have fewer than 372 observations due to missing 
data. ***, ** and * represent two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix E. 
51 
 
 TABLE 8 
Proportion of Total Disclosure Provided Exclusively in Conference Call 
Variable  
(Exp. 
sign) PROPORT   
INTERCEPT   -2.560 ** 
   (-2.19) 
     SHTURN  (+) 0.3822 *** 
   (2.78)  
     LITIG  (–) -0.450 *** 
   (-3.54) 
     NYSE  (–) 0.229 
   (0.62)  
     ABSURP  (+) 76.205 ** 
   (2.12)  
     DISPER06  (+) 29.552 ** 
   (1.88)  
     NUMIO  (+) 0.000 
   (0.65)  
     NUMEST  (+) 0.012 
   (0.75)  
     PREVIOUS  (–) -0.561 *** 
   (-3.52) 
     AFTERHRS   0.086 
   (0.34)  
     LMV   0.142 
   (1.07)  
     MB   0.0031 
   (0.19)  
     
R
2
   11.8 
Observations     361  
 
This table provides the results of estimating equation (2). We implement Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996)’s GLM method for fractional dependent variables. T-statistics computed using Huber-White 
robust standard errors, clustered on the 12 Fama-French (1997) industries, are reported in 
parentheses. *** and ** represent one-tailed statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively, where significance is reported using a one-tailed test for coefficients with predicted 
signs and using a two-tailed test otherwise. The upper and lower 1% of continuous independent 
variables are winsorized to mitigate the effect of outliers. All variables are defined in Appendix E. 
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TABLE 9 
Analyst Reaction to Management Guidance 
Variable  
(Exp. 
sign) 
ABMED 
CHG   
ABMEAN 
CHG  
(Exp. 
sign) 
DISPER 
CHG 
INTERCEPT   0.001  0.001   -0.255 
   (1.07)   (1.06)    (-0.96) 
            
PROPORT  (+) 0.0004 
**
  0.001 
***
 (-) -0.021 
   (2.07)   (3.03)    (-0.50) 
            
ABRET  (+) 0.023 
***
 0.025 
***
 (?) 1.070 
**
 
   (5.26)   (5.38)    (2.66)  
            
ABSURP  (+) 0.421 
***
 0.466 
**
  (?) -13.791 
**
 
   (3.71)   (2.58)    (-2.26) 
            
MISS  (+) 0.001 
***
 0.001 
**
  (?) 0.082 
   (2.73)   (2.42)    (1.45)  
            
MISS*ABSURP  (+) -0.032  0.058  (?) 12.770 
   (-0.24)  (0.25)    (0.86)  
            
ABGUIDESURP  (+) 0.212 
**
  0.352 
**
  (?) 9.597 
   (2.31)   (2.28)    (0.68)  
            
LMV   0.000  0.000 
*
   0.012 
   (-1.19)  (-1.66)   (0.45)  
            
MB   0.000  0.000   0.005 
**
 
   (0.11)   (-0.22)   (2.65)  
 
 
           
R
2
   30.30%  36.85%   3.05% 
Observations     358    358      358  
 
This table provides the results of estimating equation (3). T-statistics computed using Huber-White 
robust standard errors, clustered on the 12 Fama-French (1997) industries, are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, where 
significance is reported using a one-tailed test for coefficients with predicted signs and using a two-
tailed test otherwise. Analyst reaction, from immediately prior to the earnings announcement to 
seven calendar days later, is measured using three methods: 1) the absolute change in median 
consensus forecast, scaled by price (ABMEDCHG), 2) the absolute change in mean consensus 
forecast, scaled by price (ABMEANCHG), and 3) the percentage change in forecast dispersion, where 
dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts (DISPERCHG).  The upper and 
lower 1% of continuous variables are winsorized to mitigate the effect of outliers. All variables are 
defined in Appendix E. 
